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SATISFACTION OF A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST OR SIMPLY TWO CONVICTIONS

FOR THE PRICE OF ONE?
JON J. JENSEN*
S. RoSENQUIST**

KERRY

I.

INTRODUCTION

North Dakota, while not unique, has an interesting jurisdictional composition of federal, state, and tribal jurisdictions.' While
most practitioners are intimately familiar with the interplay of federal and state jurisdictions, relatively few practitioners are as
familiar with the interplay between state and tribal jurisdictions
and/or federal and tribal jurisdictions. However, considering the
fact that North Dakota has five Indian reservations located either
completely or partially within the state, it is likely that most practitioners will have contact either directly or indirectly with one or
more of the tribal courts located within the state of North Dakota
sometime during their career.2
The primary objective of this article is to examine the interplay between federal and tribal criminal jurisdictions. More specifically, this article will examine the circumstances which allow
the prosecution in federal court of Native American defendants by
the United States following a prior prosecution in the tribal court
of the same defendants for crimes arising from the same set of
facts.3 A second objective of this article is to present a number of
* Associate with the firm of Pearson, Christensen, Larivee & Fischer, Grand Forks,
North Dakota; J.D., 1990, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota; B.S.,
1987, Mankato State University, Mankato, Minnesota. From August 1990 through August
1991, Mr. Jensen served as a law clerk to the Honorable Ralph Erickstad, Chief Justice of
the North Dakota Supreme Court, whose knowledge and sense of justice sparked the
author's interest in Indian law.
** Associate with the Arnason Law Office, Grand Forks, North Dakota; J.D., 1991,
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota; B.S., 1987, Minot State University,
Minot, North Dakota. Special thanks to Noel Mears and Pam Hrncir for their efforts in
deciphering my notes into a readable format. Also, special thanks to the LAW REVIEW staff
for their continued support and encouragement to complete this project.
1. An excellent discussion of the parameters of state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction can
be found in FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982 ed.).

2. Jesse C. Trentadue, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Collection Suits By Local
Merchants and Lenders: An Obstacle To Credit For Reservation lndian. 13 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 12 (1987) (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Supplementary Report, American
Indian Areas and Alaska Native Villages: 1980 Census of Population 24 (1984). The
following reservations are located either partially or completely within North Dakota: Fort
Berthold, Fort Totten, Standing Rock, Turtle Mountain, and Sisseton Wahpeton. Id.
3. See infra notes 10-63 and accompanying text. A responsive article, Easton, Native
American Crime Victims Deserve Justice: A Response to Jensen and Rosenquist, 69 N.D. L.
REV. 939 (1993) [hereinafter "Victims Deserve Justice"] has been submitted as a companion
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possible challenges to the subsequent prosecution in federal court
by the United States.4 These objectives will be accomplished by
first providing an overview of the authors' perceived problem, and
by examining the jurisdictional quagmire which gives rise to the
problem.5 The authors will then review the Justice Department's
internal Petite' policy which supposedly limits such prosecutions.
Finally, the authors will provide defense practitioners with several
possible challenges to such prosecutions.7
It is not the intent of this article to advocate that the federal
government should refrain from all prosecutions where a tribal
court has previously acted. Indeed, the existing jurisdictional
structure between federal, state, and tribal courts compels federal
prosecution under many circumstances.8 However, where the tribal court has acted, federal authorities should refrain from using
their prosecutorial power where there is no longer an existing
compelling and unvindicated governmental interest.9 The power
to prosecute can be abused as well as appropriately used.
II.

THE ISSUE: PROSECUTION OF NATIVE AMERICANS
BY THE UNITED STATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT FOLLOWING A PRIOR PROSECUTION OF THE
SAME INDIVIDUAL IN A TRIBAL COURT

During the past several years, the general public followed the
trial of four Los Angeles, California police officers for the beating
of Rodney King. We repeatedly watched the appalling home
videotape which captures the brutality inflicted upon a citizen of
the United States by members of an organization entrusted to
keep the peace. In shock, anger, and despair, we watched the
tragic aftermath of the riots in Los Angeles following the acquittal
of the four police officers by a jury in the state trial.' ° With quesarticle to this article. The authors encourage the reader to review both articles with the
hope of stimulating further comment and discussion of the interaction of federal, state, and
tribal jurisdictions. Although Easton has recharacterized some of the authors' assertions
into illogical extremes (i.e. the authors have never proposed that the crimes of murder,
rape, or kidnapping go unpunished), Easton has provided an overview from the perspective
of the Native American victim.
4. See infra notes 103-146 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 10-63 and accompanying text.
6. The Petite policy is named after the United States Supreme Court decision in Petite
v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). See infra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 103-146 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
10. See Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy,and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE LJ. 281, 302 (1992) (citing Tom Mathews, The Siege ofL.A.,
NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 20).
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tions of why the constitutional protection from double jeopardy

did not prevent federal prosecutors from retrying the case in a
federal district court, we watched the four police officers tried a
second time, resulting in the convictions of two of the officers and
acquittals of the other two officers.ll
While at first glance the subsequent prosecution of an individual by federal authorities following a prior prosecution in a separate jurisdiction on charges supported by the same set of facts may

seem odd, such circumstances may not be that uncommon in
North Dakota. A recent scenario consisted of a Native American

juvenile who was convicted by tribal authorities and was subsequently prosecuted for the identical offense by federal authorities. 1 2 Another recent scenario involved the prosecution of a

Native American in federal court who had already been tried and
convicted in a tribal court for the same offense.' 3 Because the tribal court is limited by federal law in the length of the jail term it
may impose upon an individual, a the federal authorities retried
the case in a federal district court and ultimately obtained a conviction and longer sentence.' 5
"The Supreme Court has long held that an acceptable cost of
federalism, tolerable under the principles of both double jeopardy
and due process, is the risk of successive prosecutions by state and
federal authorities for identical conduct."' 6 This principle is often
referred to as the "dual sovereignty" doctrine and applies regardless of whether or not the initial prosecution resulted in a convic11. See generally Gary A. Hengstler, How Judges View Retrial of L.A. Cops, ABA
JOURNAL, Aug. 1993, at 70. In a poll conducted by the Gallup Organization, Inc., thirty
percent of the responding state court trial judges indicated that the retrial of the police
officers in the Rodney King beating case would constitute double jeopardy. Id. at 71. In the
aftermath of the Rodney King trials, some authors have questioned whether the double
jeopardy clause has been swallowed by the dual sovereignty exception. See Darlene Ricker,
Double Exposure: Did the Second Rodney King Trial Violate Double Jeopardy?, ABA
JOURNAL, Aug. 1991, at 66.

12. United States v. J.A.L., No. J2-91-88-02 (D.N.D. filed Feb. 19, 1992). See also
United States v. Azure, No. C2-92-40-01 (D.N.D. filed Oct. 26, 1992).
13. United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Demery, 980
F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1992).
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988) (providing that tribal courts are limited to the
imposition of a sentence not to exceed one year and/or a fine not to exceed $5,000.00).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Demery, 980 F.2d 1187 (8th Cir. 1992). Demery received
a one-year sentence by tribal authorities. Id. Following a subsequent federal conviction,
Demery received a sentence of forty-seven months. Id. The authors would like the reader
to note that not all federal prosecutions following tribal convictions should be prohibited.
See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. Where genuine compelling unvindicated
governmental interests exist, the United States Attorney's Office should use all of its powers
and available resources to see that the interests of justice are served.
16. United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 909 (2nd Cir. 1984).
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recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1852. "
the dual sovereignty doctrine has been recognized
and federal prosecutions 20 and in dual tribal
prosecutions.
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doctrine was
Additionally,
in dual state
and federal

The United States Justice Department has promulgated an
internal policy which is intended to prevent the unnecessary and
unjust prosecution under such circumstances. 2 2 This policy, often
referred to as the "Petite" policy, provides that the federal prosecution of an individual following a prior prosecution by a separate
sovereign is barred unless there are compelling reasons existing to
satisfy an unvindicated governmental interest.2 3 However, the
17. Id. (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), which upheld the
prosecution following a prior conviction in state court).
18. Id. (citing Bartkus v. United States, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907
(1959), which upheld the prosecution of a defendant in state court following the acquittal of
the defendant in federal court).
19. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 909 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13
(1852)). The United States Supreme Court noted in Aboumoussallem that there were
problems with concurrent federal and state jurisdiction, which were first noted in the case
of Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 5 (1820). Id. at 909 n.l. Abbate v. United States
provides a history of the issues arising from the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal
law. 359 U.S. 187, 190-94 (1958).
20. In response to a growing number of state decisions precluding concurrent dual
prosecutions, the United States Supreme Court thoroughly considered this question in
several cases from 1847 to 1852, beginning with the 1847 decision of Fox v. Ohio, which
held that the same act may constitute an offense against both the state and federal
governments. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847) The United States Supreme Court
revisited the dual prosecution issue in 1850 and 1852 when it allowed the criminalization of
the same conduct by both the state and federal governments. See United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569-70 (1850) (affirming the Court's prior decision in Fox by
addressing the same federal statute and stating that the same act could be an offense against
both the state and the federal government); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment does not bar state prosecution for the same offense
previously prosecuted by the federal government). Discussion of multiple prosecutions
remained dormant for approximately seventy years until the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Lanza, which directly upheld the dual prosecution of
defendants in state and federal courts. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Wheeler involved the
prosecution of a Navajo tribal member who had pleaded guilty to a charge of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. Id. at 315. He was subsequently indicted by a federal grand
jury on charges of statutory rape for the same factual situation. Id. The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds of double jeopardy, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's ruling. Id. at 316. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit holding that the tribal court was the arm of a separate sovereign and subsequent
federal prosecution was not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 316-32.
22. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-2.142 [hereinafter USAM]. This policy is
often referred to as the Petite policy, after the Supreme Court decision that first discussed
the policy, Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (per curiam). The United States
Supreme Court has discussed the Petite policy on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Rinaldi v.
United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
23. USAM § 9-2.142. See infra note 62 for a discussion of the application of the Petite
policy to tribal sovereigns.
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application of the Petite policy has been erratic and inconsistent.2
III.

4

DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND REASONS WHY THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE DOES NOT PREVENT
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS

The United States Supreme Court's 1959 decisions in Bartkus
v. Illinois25 and Abbate v. United States 2 6 laid the foundation for
the principle that there is no bar to successive state and federal
prosecutions.2 7 The Supreme Court in Bartkus upheld the conviction of the defendant on the basis that the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not
apply to the states and therefore did not prevent the state of Illinois from prosecuting the defendant following an acquittal by a
federal jury.2 8 In United States v. Lanza,2 9 the Supreme Court
implied that even if the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause
did extend to the states, offenses which are committed against separate sovereigns are not the same offense for the purposes of
double jeopardy.3 °
The Supreme Court solidified its decision in Bartkus in a second opinion on a related issue the same day in Abbate.3 1 In
Abbate, the Supreme Court refined its opinion on dual sovereignty, recognizing that citizens of the United States are also citizens of the individual states. 32 The dual sovereignty of the
jurisdictions subjects its citizens to the criminal laws of each sovereign. 3 3 Each sovereign has an undeniable interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws, and, as such, the prosecution of a
defendant by state authorities does not prevent the subsequent
prosecution of the same individual by federal authorities, nor does
the prosecution of an individual by federal authorities prevent a
subsequent prosecution of the individual for the same act by the
24. Joseph S. Allerhand, Note, The Petite Policy: An Example of Enlightened
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 66 GEO. L. J. 1137, 1138 (1978); Dawson, supra note 10, at 293.
"[W]hile the policy limits the instances of federal prosecutions following state prosecutions,
such prosecutions are brought routinely." id. at 294.
25. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
26. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
27. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128-39 (1958); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 196 (1958).
28. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121-24, 138.
29. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
30. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
31. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
32. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. at 192 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
13, 20 (1852)).
33. Id.
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state authorities.34 Therefore, in order to avoid the undesirable
consequence of estopping a sovereign from enforcing its criminal
laws, the Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment
could not bar subsequent prosecu35
tions by separate sovereigns.
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court elected to apply
the protection of double jeopardy to the states, thereby eliminat36
ing the original basis for allowing double prosecution in Bartkus.
However, the Court simply switched its emphasis from the question of whether the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause
applied to the states to the alternative position, previously preserved in Bartkus, which was that dual sovereignty allowed dual
34. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). "[Lanza] was the first case in
which [the Supreme Court] squarely held valid a federal prosecution arising out of the same
facts which had been the basis of a state conviction .
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 129. In
Abbate, the Court quoted from the Lanza decision:
"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory....
Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and
dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both an may be
punished by each. The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the
first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal Government,
... and the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under
authority of the Federal Government after a first trial for the same offense under
the same authority."
Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (ellipses in
original).
35. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195. In Abbate, the Court stated that "undesirable
consequences" would result if double jeopardy barred dual prosecutions. Id.
Prosecution by one sovereign for a relatively minor offense might bar
prosecution by the other for a much graver one, thus effectively depriving the
latter of the right to enforce its own laws. While, the Court said, conflict might
be eliminated by making federal jurisdiction exclusive where it exists, such a
"marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal justice"
would not be desirable.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978) (quoting Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195) (footnotes omitted).
36. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937)) (superseded by statute as stated in Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
775 P.2d 348 (1989)). Prior to 1969, the Supreme Court had held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not apply to the states. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124. Therefore, the protections of
the Fifth Amendment did not prevent dual prosecutions from occurring. Id.
Before 1969, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the states. Indeed,
the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the states in Palko
v. Connecticut. The Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not so
fundamental as to warrant application to the states. Only in cases of "acute and
shocking" hardship would the Court prohibit double jeopardy by the states-and
then under the rubric of due process.
Dawson, supra note 10, at 290 (footnotes omitted). In Benton, the Court overruled the
decision in Palko by recognizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause was a "fundamental
ideal" and of such importance that it must be applied to the states. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
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prosecutions by separate sovereigns.3" Therefore, while the prosecution of the Double Jeopardy Clause could prevent two prosecutions by the same sovereign, those protections do not prevent
prosecution by several sovereigns for the same criminal act.
The separate sovereignty of individual states is fundamental
to our federalist system.38 However, Indian reservations do not
enjoy the same status as states.39 Instead, Indian reservations, run
by individual tribes, exist as quasi-sovereigns established by an
attempt to balance the interest of tribal self-government and the
federal interest of limiting the tribe's external power.4 °
The sovereignty of the tribes was initially preserved by three
United States Supreme Court cases decided during the mid1800s.41 Those three decisions provide the foundation for preserv37. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 128-39. In Bartkus and Abbate, the Supreme Court
determined that federal prosecutions were not prohibited because of a prior state
prosecution for the following two reasons: 1) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the states, and 2) even if the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment were to apply, the dual sovereignty doctrine allowed prosecutions by the
state and federal government. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124-26; Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195. Benton
eliminated the first basis for the holdings in Bartkus and Abbate, but kept alive the dual
sovereignty doctrine. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 789 (1969).
38. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137-39. In Bartkus,Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
noted:
Some recent suggestions that the Constitution was in reality a deft device for
establishing a centralized government are not only without factual justification
but fly in the face of history. It has more accurately been shown that the men
who wrote the Constitution as well as the citizens of the member States of the
Confederation were fearful of the power of centralized government and sought
to limit its power .... Time has not lessened the concern of the Founders in
devising a federal system which would likewise be a safeguard against arbitrary
government.
Id. at 137. Even recently the Supreme Court has noted that the basis of the dual sovereignty doctrine derives from the federalist form of government in which "State and Federal Governments '[derive] power from different sources,' each from the organic power
that established it." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978) (citing United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,382 (1922). "The unique concept of dual sovereignty arises from the
federal system under which state governments and the federal government coexist."
United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 671 (D. Ct. Va. 1991) (Amendment denied, 769
F.Supp. 201 (1991).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) ("[Tribes] were, and
always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserve
their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations..."). While Indian nations are considered sovereign entities, they are no longer
"possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty." Id. at 381. In United States v. Wheeler, the
Court noted the following in discussing Kagama and Indian sovereignty: "Their
incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its
protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had
previously exercised." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). "The sovereignty
that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited nature." Id.
40. Id. at 322-24. While the sovereignty of Indian tribes has been eroded, the tribes
still possess attributes of sovereignty which extends over both its people and territory. Id. at
323.
41. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (abrogation recognized by People
v. Snyder, 532 N.Y. S.2d 827 (1988)); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
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hmg tribal self-government within the federalist framework.4 2
While these three early Supreme Court decisions articulated a policy of preserving tribal self-government, the United States Constitution provides Congress with the ultimate and exclusive power
over the tribes and their affairs.43
Utilizing its constitutional authority, Congress has provided a
legislatively mandated structure for criminal jurisdiction for tribal
courts and federal courts over crimes occurring on tribal lands.44
There are two significant pieces of legislation that control criminal
45
jurisdiction in Indian Country: the Indian Country Crimes Act
46
and the Indian Major Crimes Act.

The Indian Country Crimes Act provides the broadest extension of jurisdiction over the tribes by the federal government.47
The Indian Country Crimes Act provides the following:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the
Indian Country who has been punished by the local law of
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the
exclusive jurisdiction over such offense is or may be
secured to the Indian tribes respectively.4 8
The above text of the Indian Country Crimes Act discloses
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). For further discussion on Worcester and
other tribal sovereignty opinions and the consistency with which they have been followed,
the authors suggest referring to Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24
MINN. L. REv. 145, 148-49 (1940).
42. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). Indian tribes are located
within the territory of the United States and are subject to ultimate federal control. Id. at
322. However,-the Indian peoples remain 'a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal social relations.' Id. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82
(1886)).
43. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6, § Al, p. 282. Congressional power over Indian
tribes "is beyond doubt in most situations." Id.
44. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1170 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This Act has been referred to by a
number of names, including, but not limited to the "General Crimes Act" and the
"Interracial Crimes Act."
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
48. Id. The Supreme Court has held that crimes which are wholly non-Indian crimes
fall under state criminal jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that they may have occurred on
tribal land. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
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two broad exceptions to the prosecution of Indian defendants by
federal authorities. 49 First, offenses which are committed by Indians against Indians would be excluded from federal prosecution.5"
The second exception would prevent the prosecution of any
Indian who had previously "been punished by the local law of
the tribe."'5 1 Read in isolation, the exceptions enumerated in the
Indian Country Crimes Act would appear to preserve the protection from double jeopardy for Indians who had been previously
punished by the tribe from being prosecuted by the United
States.52 The purpose of the Indian Country Crimes Act and these
exceptions was to recognize tribal self-government and
sovereignty. 53
However, the exemption from prosecution of individuals who
had previously been punished by the tribal authorities had the
potential for great injustice.54 For example, an individual could
avoid federal prosecution of a serious crime by simply submitting
to the tribal authorities and subjecting herself/himself to the penalties imposed for a lesser offense. 55 In response to this potential
misuse of the exception to the Indian Country Crimes Act, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act.5 6
The Major Crimes Act specifically identified fourteen offenses
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6, § A2(a), p.
288. On its face, the Indian Country Crimes Act appears very broad. However, its
application has been substantially limited by judicial interpretations and the exceptions
found within the Act itself. Id.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
51. Id.
52. Id.; COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6, § A2(aXl), p. 290. There are no reported cases
on this issue. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar dual federal and tribal prosecutions.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 313 (1978).
53. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6, § A2(aXl), p. 290-98.
54. Id. at p. 290. An example of this injustice allegedly occurred in Ex Parte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883). The Supreme Court held in Ex ParteCrow Dog that an Indian accused
of murdering another Indian in Indian Country could not be tried in either federal or
territorial courts. Id. at 572.
55. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). In United States v. Wheeler, the
Supreme Court described the problem:
Thus, when both a federal prosecution for a major crime and a tribal prosecution
for a lesser included offense are possible, the defendant will often face the
potential of a mild tribal punishment and a federal punishment of substantial
severity. Indeed, the respondent in the present case faced the possibility of a
federal sentence of 15 years in prison, but received a tribal sentence of no more
than 75 days and a small fine. In such a case, the prospect of avoiding more
severe federal punishment would surely motivate a member of a tribe charged
with the commission of an offense to seek to stand trial first in a tribal court.
Were the tribal prosecution held to bar the federal one, important federal
interests in the prosecution of major offenses on Indian reservations would be
frustrated.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330-31 (1978).
56. COHEN, supra note 1, at ch. 6, § A2(b), p. 300.
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which, if committed in Indian country, constitutes federal
crimes.5 7 The Major Crimes Act does not exclude individuals who
had previously been punished by local tribal law from punishment
by the United States. 58 While some authorities believe that the
exception should not be limited to the Indian Country Crimes Act,
the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v.
Wheeler5 9 that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause do
not prevent the prosecution of an individual by the federal government for the same acts previously punished by the tribal
court.6 ° In Wheeler, the Supreme Court clearly provided that the
inherent powers of the tribes arise from their retained sovereignty
and not from the sovereignty of the United States. 6 1 Because tribal authority arises from the tribal sovereignty, the tribes must be
treated as separate sovereigns similar to the states with respect to
the application of the Fifth Amendment protection from double
jeopardy. 62 Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988). The following is a list of crimes that if committed in
Indian Country, could still be prosecuted by the federal government: murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, rape, incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
with intent to commit murder, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This
article has focused upon these crimes which would commonly be considered less serious:
burglary, robbery, and theft. This is not to imply that these crimes should be ignored, but it
is with those crimes that tribal courts have been able to provide sufficient penalties to
eliminate the government's compelling unvindicated interests. For example, in the case of
United States v. Azure, the defendant had previously spent thirty-five days in tribal custody.
United States v. Azure, No. C2-92-40 (D.N.D. 1992). The federal sentencing guidelines
provided a sentence range of zero to six months, with the United States Attorney's Office
recommending no further custody. It is under these types of circumstances that the
authors believe no further prosecution is necessary and no compelling unvindicated
interest remains. Discouragingly, in Victims Deserve Justice, supra note 3, at nn.4-5 and
accompanying text, Mr. Easton prefers to focus on the crimes of murder and rape rather
than focusing on the issues asserted in this article.
58. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978).
59. 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
60. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
61. Id. at 328.
62. Id. "Since tribal and federal prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns, they
are not 'for the same offense,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one when
the other has occurred." Id. at 329-30.
In Victims Deserve Justice,supra note 3, Mr. Easton argues that the Petite policy does
not apply to Indian reservations. See Victims Deserve Justice, supra note 3, at nn.67-93 and
accompanying text. The authors respectfully disagree. In United States v. Lester, a case
argued by Mr. Easton for the Appellant (the United States), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with the argument that the Petite policy should prevent the
prosecution of an individual in a federal court once the defendant had been convicted of a
crime in tribal court for conduct arising out of the same set of facts. United States v. Lester,
992 F.2d 174, 175 (8th Cir. 1993). United States District Court Judge for the District of
North Dakota Patrick A. Conmy had dismissed the prosecution in the trial court. Id.
Assuming Mr. Easton raised the same arguments to the Eighth Circuit as are raised in his
article, we are left with the conclusion that the Eighth Circuit did not adopt Mr. Easton's
reasoning. In Lester, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal on the basis that the Petite
policy did not create any substantive rights. Id. at 176 (citing United States v. Simpkins, 953
F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1988).
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Amendment is not applicable to second prosecutions by the fed-

eral government because federal prosecutions and tribal prosecu63
tions are "arms of separate sovereigns.1
IV. THE PETITE POLICY AND ITS INTENDED BAR OF
DOUBLE PROSECUTIONS
The Petite policy is an internal Justice Department policy
which "precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution following a state prosecution or a prior federal prosecution
based on substantially the same act, acts or transactions unless

there is a compelling federal interest supporting the dual or successive federal prosecution."64 The policy was named after the
United States Supreme Court decision in Petite v. United States."
The Petite policy serves dual purposes: assuring fairness to the
defendant by protecting the defendant for unfair multiple prosecutions and/or punishments for the same acts, and promoting the
efficient use of Justice Department resources.66 The Petite policy
regulates prosecutorial discretion to accomplish its two purposes.
It is the authors' opinion that the Eighth Circuit's silence on an issue presumably raised by
Mr. Easton is more likely to imply that the argument was meritless as opposed to
dispositive.
63. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330.
64. USAM § 9-34. The United States Justice Department has a longstanding policy
which is intended to prohibit unnecessary multiple prosecutions. See Rinaldi v. United
States, 434 U.S. 22, 24 (1977). The Petite policy requires prior approval and a compelling
interest justifying the prosecution. See generally Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248
(1980).
65. 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
66. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977). "The policy is useful to the efficient
management of limited Executive resources and encourages local responsibility in law
enforcement. But it also serves the more important purpose of protecting the citizen from
any unfairness that is associated with successive prosecutions based on the same conduct."
Id. The following portions of a press release by Attorney General Rogers at the time the
policy was instituted are quoted in Rinaldi:
Cooperation between federal and state prosecutive officers is essential if the
gears of the federal and state systems are to mesh properly. We should continue
to make every effort to cooperate with the state and local authorities to the end
that the trial occur in the jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the
public interest is best served. If this be determined accurately, and is followed
by efficient and intelligent cooperation of state and federal law enforcement
authorities, then the consideration of a second prosecution very seldom should
arise....
It is our duty to observe not only the rulings of the Court but the spirit of the
ruling as well. In effect, the Court said that although the rule of the Lanza case
is sound law, enforcement officers should use care in applying it. Applied
indiscriminately and with bad judgment it, like most rules of law, could cause
considerable hardship. Applied wisely, it is a rule that is in the public interest.
Consequently-as the Court clearly indicated-those of us charged with law
enforcement responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and with selfrestraint in this area.
Id. at 27-29 (quoting Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 6, 1959, p. 3).
67. Id. at 27. "The policy is intended to regulate prosecutorial discretion in order to
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The Petite policy was developed as a direct result of the

United States Supreme Court's decisions in Bartkus v. United
States6" and Abbate v. United States.69 The policy was promulgated on April 6, 1959, by Attorney General Rogers and provided
that after a state prosecution there should be no federal trial for
substantially the same act "unless the reasons are compelling."70

Attorney General Rogers anticipated that the policy would
encourage the efficient management of resources and help to
encourage local responsibility in law enforcement by limiting the
prosecutor's discretion to initiate prosecution. 7 1 However, in
Rinaldi v. United States,7 2 the Supreme Court recognized that the
most important purpose of the policy was to protect the accused
citizen from the potential unfairness of being repeatedly prosecuted for the same act.7 3
If circumstances exist which would give rise to the application
of the policy, the local United States Attorney is required to seek
authorization from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General
prior to initiating the second prosecution.7 4 The failure to secure
approval prior to the double prosecution may result in the loss of
the conviction through a dismissal of the charges unless the prosecuting attorney is able to show both a compelling federal interest
to support the prosecution and can demonstrate a compelling reason as to why prior approval was not obtained. 5
Approval must be sought in all instances where there has been
prior proceedings which resulted in either a conviction, acquittal,
dismissal, or other termination of the proceedings on the merits.7 6
The approval must be obtained prior to the acceptance of a guilty
plea or the start of trial.7 7
promote efficient utilization of the Department's resources and to protect persons charged
with criminal conduct from the unfairness associated with multiple prosecutions and
multiple punishments for substantially the same act or acts." USAM § 9-2.142(A).
68. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
69. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). "What came to be known as the Petite policy was formulated
by the Justice Department in direct response to this Court's opinions in Bartkus v. United
States... and Abbate v. United States. . . , holding that the Constitution does not deny the
State and Federal Governments the power to prosecute the same act." Rinaldi,434 U.S. at
28. See also Allerhand, supra note 24, at 1138-39.
70. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 24 n.5. See supra note 66. Substantial portions of Attorney
General Rogers' April 6, 1959 memo can be found in Rinaldi, 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
71. Allerhand, supra note 24, at 1142.
72. 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
73. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977).
74. USAM § 9-2.142; see generally United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir.
1986) (discussing the need for special approval for a successive prosecution).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 9-35 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.

1993]

Two CONVICTIONS FOR ONE PRICE?

927

The general guidelines of the Justice Department Manual

mandates that federal prosecution will not be authorized unless
the prior prosecution "left substantial federal interests demonstrably unvindicated. ' '1 8 Even when a substantial federal interest
remains unvindicated, prosecution is not to be approved if the
prior proceeding resulted in a conviction, unless the United State's
Attorney's Office anticipates that the subsequent federal proceedings will result in a significantly enhanced punishment.7 9

V. THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITE POLICY HAS
BEEN INCONSISTENT
The application of the Petite policy has been erratic and

unpredictable. 8° As the reader will discover in the remainder of
the article, it is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the Petite policy.8 The policy is internal to the Justice Department and courts
have been reluctant to enforce the policy against the United States
Attorney's Office. 82 This leaves the administration and application
of the policy in the hands of the prosecution.8 3 The abundance of
78. Id. at 9-38 (footnote omitted). "A federal prosecution will not be authorized unless
the state/prior federal proceeding left substantial federal interests demonstrably
unvindicated. Even so, a dual or successive prosecution is not warranted unless a
conviction is anticipated and-if the state/prior federal proceeding resulted in a
conviction-normally will be authorized unless an enhanced sentence in the subsequent
federal prosecution is anticipated." USAM § 9-2.142.
79. Id.; see also infra note 82.
80. Dawson, supra note 10, at 293-94.
The Petite policy is an incomplete limitation on federal prosecution following
state prosecution, however. The policy is invoked at the government's
discretion. It does not confer upon those prosecuted for state crimes the right to
challenge a subsequent federal prosecution in violation of the policy. Cases in
which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded convictions under the Petite
policy have been disposed of by per curiam order so as to avoid creating any
impression of the existence of a "right of criminal defendants to obtain
enforcement of the policy." Furthermore, while the policy limits the instances
of federal prosecutions following state prosecutions, such prosecutions are
brought routinely.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Allerhand, supra note 24, at 1138.
The policy envisions an enlightened use of prosecutorial discretion to assure fairness to defendants as well as a minimum of wasted effort. The present administration of the policy, however, raises serious doubts about whether either of
these goals is being achieved: the Department of Justice has failed to reduce the
policy's broad formulations to specific guidelines, and exceptions to the policy
remain undefined and open ended.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. See, e.g. United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that
"the Petite policy does not generally confer substantive rights"). See also Allerhand, supra
note 24, at 1145-46.
82. See United States v. Jones, 334 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 379 U.S.
993 (1965). The enforcement of the Petite policy rests in the hands of the Department of
Justice. Id. The courts should not attempt to enforce the Petite policy, but should allow the
Department of Justice to use its discretion as to when the policy should be applied. Id.
83. Id. Courts have even been reluctant to determine whether or not a compelling

928

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:915

cases in which defendants have unsuccessfully attempted to persuade courts to enforce the Petite policy provides ample evidence
that the discretion to prosecute remains with the government and
that prosecutions will be brought regardless of the intended purposes of the Petite policy.8 4 In some instances, even the federal

judiciary has become frustrated with the failure to utilize the
Petite doctrine to limit prosecutions where it felt the appropriate
85
circumstances existed.

The personal experience of the authors and comments from
the practicing bar indicated that more often than not, the United
States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota has been
reluctant to drop prosecutions once they have been initiated. 8
The reluctance to drop prosecutions has at times been contrary to
the intended purpose of the Petite policy. For example, the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota
recently prosecuted a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of the
Chippewa for theft.87 The federal prosecution was initiated after
unvindicated governmental interest is present. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 409 F.
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1988 (1992); United States v.
Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2nd
Cir. 1984). Despite the proclamations in the Petite policy, federal prosecutions following
state prosecutions have become routine. Dawson, supra note 10, at 294.
85. See United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991) (Amendment
denied, 769 F.Supp. 201 (1991). While finding an alternative route to dismiss an unfair
prosecution, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia stated:
Though the court is loath to tell the United States Attorney how to conduct his
affairs, it is important to realize that the United States Attorney's application of
the Petite Doctrine is inconsistent with the Doctrine's terms .... At least it is
certain that there has not been a finding of a "compelling federal interest" in this
case .... [This] court personally is persuaded that the Petite Doctrine should
confer substantive rights on criminal defendants. The Court agrees with the
dissenting opinion in United States v. Thompson ....
Belcher, 762 F. Supp. at 674-75, nn. 5-6 (citations omitted).
86. This is contrary to the assertions of Mr. Easton in Victims Deserve Justice, supra
note 3. The authors wish to note that they have substantially more experience in criminal
cases than Mr. Easton would have the reader believe. The authors collectively have
defended approximately 300 criminal matters to date. Moreover, Mr. Rosenquist, whose
undergraduate degree was in criminal justice, effected approximately 400 arrests on over
1600 citations and warrants issued during a five-year stint as a police officer. Admittedly,
the lion's share of the above experience did not involve the federal court system. The
authors have, however, appeared as both defense counsel and the state's witness in
hundreds of criminal cases. Not once in the authors' personal experience has the federal
government decided that it had a substantial unvindicated federal interest requiring a
subsequent prosecution based on the same set of facts, for any previously-tried state's case.
Mr. Easton, as well as the reader, is undoubtedly aware that not all of the above cases
resulted in a conviction and a jail/prison sentence equal to or within the range of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The rhetorical question skirted by Mr. Easton remains
unanswered: Why are Indians routinely prosecuted twice for the same crime while
Caucasians are not?
87. United States v. Azure, No. C2-92-40-01 (D.N.D. filed Oct. 26, 1992). The
defendant was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 661 and 662. Id.
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the individual had previously been prosecuted in the tribal court
and had been incarcerated for a period of thirty-five days.8 8 The
defendant pled guilty to the federal charges and the United States
Attorney's Office recommended to the court that no jail time
should be imposed.""
A similar case was that of United States v. JA.L.9 ° In that case,

two juveniles had taken and damaged a vehicle. Both admitted
their involvement in tribal court proceedings and were punished
by the court, consistent with similar situations handled by North
Dakota state juvenile courts. The United States Attorney's Office

prosecuted both juveniles again, obtained convictions, and recommended no rehabilitative time in either a state or federal juvenile
center. 9 1
While the increased nature of the federal crime in the situation above may have provided a basis for the federal prosecution,
prosecution under such circumstances seems contrary to the Petite
policy's goal of efficiently allocating law enforcement resources
and providing fairness to the defendant. 9 2 Furthermore, the additional burden on the already overloaded federal court system
should have been reason enough to prevent the prosecution of an
individual who had already served time in jail and who the prosecution recommended should not serve any more jail time.9 3 The
cost of the court's time, the cost of providing court-appointed
defense counsel, and the administrative costs associated with the
88. The authors made repeated requests to receive a copy of the tribal court records
but had been unsuccessful in doing so on the date this article was submitted.
89. Azure, No. C2-92-40-01. The United States Attorney's Office recommendation of
no term of incarceration returned some level of fairness to the proceedings. Unfortunately,
the court elected not to follow those recommendations and sentenced the defendant to
three months of incarceration.
90. J2-91-88-02 (D.N.D. filed Feb. 19, 1992).
91. United States v. J.A.L., J2-91-88-02 (D.N.D. filed Feb. 19, 1992). The names of the
juveniles cannot be disclosed. Following their respective admissions to being involved in
the delinquent behavior, they were ordered by the Tribal Court to undergo a sixty day
evaluation at the State Industrial School in Mandan, North Dakota, and ordered to pay
restitution. The tribal court retained jurisdiction over the matter for sentencing based on
the outcome of their respective evaluations. While awaiting space and transportation back
to Mandan, both boys were incarcerated in the Belcourt jail for almost three weeks. They
were released to the custody of their parents on the morning another inmate had
committed suicide. Two months later, still having not been sent to Mandan for evaluation,
the boys both received a summons to appear in federal court for the same crime.
Ultimately, both admitted their involvement and were sentenced pursuant to Federal
Juvenile Justice requirements. (In juvenile court, defendants do not plead guilty or not
guilty to a crime, but admit or deny their involvement in the crime.) In this case, they were
given probation and ordered to make restitution.
92. USAM § 9-2.142. Tribal court punishments are limited to no greater than one year
of imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). The federal government has
jurisdiction over many major crimes on reservations and may impose more severe
penalties. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. (1988 & Supp. 1993). See also supra note 48.
93. Azure, No. C2-92-40-01.
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prosecution were all unnecessary.9 4
In an informal survey provided to the North Dakota Bar, persons who had experienced defending tribal members in federal
court following a prior conviction in the tribal justice system indicated that very few, if any, instances existed where a federal prosecution was dismissed pursuant to the Petite policy. While there are
certainly a number of possible reasons for this, it is interesting to
note that of the forty individuals who responded that they had
experienced dual prosecution of Native Americans, only one of
those individuals had experienced the double prosecution in state
and federal court. Again, this could be explained by the increased
role of the United States Attorney's Office on the reservations, the
fact that the survey excluded individuals that may have experienced only state and federal double prosecution, or the internal
differences in the operation of the tribal courts as opposed to
North Dakota state courts. 9 5
VI.

JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO ENFORCE THE POLICY

Numerous defendants have attempted and failed to gain judicial intervention and enforcement of the Petite policy.9 6 Most of
the federal circuits have at least partially addressed this question
and held that a defendant does not have an enforceable right
94. In Victims DeserveJustice, supra note 3, Mr. Easton criticizes the authors and tries
to convince the reader that Jensen and Rosenquist advocate a laissez faire, "hands off,"
approach by the federal government when Native Americans accused of heinous crimes on
Indian Reservations, such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and rape, or perhaps a
combination thereof, and are subsequently convicted of some lesser included misdemeanor
offense by the tribal court. Victims Deserve Justice, n.1-12 and accompanying text. It
should be obvious through the tone of this article that the authors are speaking of and
concerned with only those crimes that do not leave substantial unvindicated federal
interests once the tribal court has adjudicated them, but nevertheless result in subsequent
federal prosecution. To assert that the authors advocate misdemeanor sentences (normally
defined as crimes whereby the maximum sentence that can be imposed is a fine and/or
incarceration for under one year) for major heinous crimes is misleading. This article would
never have been written had it not been for the authors' perceived abuses of the Petite
policy by the United States Attorney's Office. The authors would like to remind the reader
that there may remain substantial, unvindicated federal interests requiring federal
prosecution in a case where a Native American accused of one of the aforementioned
infamous and heinous crimes is convicted and punished by the tribal court for a lesser
included offense. The unfairness arises when the powers and resources of the United States
Attorney's Office are used to reprosecute juveniles and petty theives who have already
been punished for the offense and who will probably not be subject to any additional
custodial time after the federal conviction. Under those circumstances, the United States
Attorney's Office has not satisfied a compelling unvindicated interest; but instead, wasted
governmental and judicial resources as well as inappropriately prosecuting the defendant.
95. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (tribal courts have punitive powers which are limited to up
to a year of imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine). The limited powers of tribal courts may
leave a compelling governmental interest unvindicated; however, as in Azure, it is the
authors' opinion that the prosecutions are motivated by reasons other than government
interest.
96. See supra note 81 and infra note 97.
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under the Petite policy. 97 The Eighth Circuit recently addressed

this question in United States v. Simpkins."8 In Simpkins, the
Eighth Circuit held that "the Petite Policy does not confer any
substantive rights on a criminal and, thus, 'cannot form the basis of
a claim that the subsequent prosecution was improper. ,,o
Enforcement of the Petite policy is denied by courts on the
basis that the Policy is an internal guideline of the United States
Department of Justice.' 0 0 Generally, an internal policy of a federal department is not enforceable by defendants or other individuals and therefore cannot be used by a defendant, by itself, to
prevent the dual prosecution. 1° 1 Several courts have specifically
held that Department of Justice guidelines are not enforceable
and cannot be used by a defendant to bar prosecution by the
United States.10 2
97. See, United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2nd Cir. 1990) (recognizing the
existence of the Petite policy but concluding that "nothing prevents a federal prosecution
whenever the state proceeding has not adequately protected the federal interest.")
(emphasis added); United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 725 (stating that the Petite policy
"affords defendants no substentive rights") (2nd Cir. 1984); see also United States v.
Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir.
1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 948 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 808
F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1986); Andiarena v. Keohane, 691 F.2d 993 (1lth Cir. 1982); United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569 (6th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1979). Compare United States v.
Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir. 1969) (stating that a government agency may be
required to follow its own regulations); Willis v. United States, 600 F.Supp. 1407, 1417 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (stating that if an agency creates regulations, "[it] may be required to carry them
out in a constitutional fashion").
98. 953 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992).
99. United States v. Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1988 (1988).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
The Department of Justice specifically excludes application of the policy with the following
disclaimer:
3. Reservation
The dual prosecution and successive federal prosecution policy statements are
set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. The
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or
criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful litigative
prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
USAM § 9-2.143.
101. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Sullivan v. United States, 348
U.S. 170 (1954).
102. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 782 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (N.D. Ala.
1992) ("The decision whether to investigate and prosecute a particular individual is
generally a matter consigned by the Constitution to the discretion of the executive
branch.") (citing Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987). See also United
States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d
564, 569 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979), ("The concept of separation of
powers underlies the courts' concern that the prosecutorial function be relatively
untrammeled.").
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ASSERTING THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
NONDISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTION

The responsibility of investigating and prosecuting criminal
offenders is reserved for and delegated to the executive branch of
the government.10 3 Generally, the decision of who will be subject
to prosecution is left to prosecutorial discretion.' 0 4 Courts are
reluctant to interfere with a decision to prosecute on the basis that

the constitutional separation of powers dictates deference to the
decision of who, when, and where to prosecute. 10 5 Therefore,
there is a rebuttable presumption that a prosecution is initiated in

good faith. 106
While courts will generally defer to prosecutorial discretion,
the government is not free from all constraints in determining
who it will prosecute.' 0

7

Courts are charged with a duty to inter-

vene where the rights afforded an individual under the Constitution and laws of the United States are in jeopardy.' 0 8 Where the
103. See generally United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1210 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) ("In formulating and prosecuting its case, the government must
be relatively unconstrained in its deployment of resources. The choice of whom to
prosecute and the strategy of prosecution are generally matters left wholly to the
government's control."). At least one scholar has questioned the wisdom of allowing
prosecutors to have unbridled discretion by stating the following:
Why should a prosecutor-say, a county prosecutor-have discretionary power
to decide not to prosecute even when the evidence of guilt is clear, perhaps
partly on the basis of political influence, without ever having to state to anyone
what evidence was brought to light by his investigation and without having to
explain to anyone why he interprets a statute as he does or why he chooses a
particular position on a difficult question of policy? Why should the discretionary
power be so unconfined that, of half a dozen potential defendants he can prove
guilty, he can select any one for prosecution and let the other five go, making his
decision, if he chooses, on the basis of considerations extraneous to justice? ...
American assumptions that the prosecutors' discretion must be uncontrolled are
very much in need of reexamination.
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 4.09, 110-12 (1972).
104. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("Selectivity in prosecutorial
decisions in general is permissible and even necessary."); United States v. Napper, 574 F.
Supp. 1521, 1523 (D.C. 1983); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Allerhand, supra
note 24, at 1155.
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1492 (11th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 835
F.2d 291 (1987) (stating that the decision of whether or not an investigation and/or
prosecution will occur has been allocated to the executive branch under the constitution);
see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 782 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1992);
United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941
(1979).
106. Torquato, 602 F.2d at 569 (citing United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616,620 (7th Cir.
1973).
107. Id. at 568 ("To permit criminal prosecutions to be initiated on the basis of
arbitrary or irrational factors would be to transform the prosecutorial function from one
protecting the public interest through impartial enforcement of the rule of law to one
permitting the exercise of prosecutorial power based on personal or political bias.").
108. United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[I]n the rare
situation in which the decision to prosecute is so abusive of this discretion as to encroach on
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prosecution's abuse of discretion of whom to prosecute encroaches
upon the defendant's constitutional rights, the judiciary must
intervene to prevent an unconstitutional deprivation.' 0 9
Selective prosecution is not permissible on the basis of such
factors as race, color, religion, or national origin. " 0 A prosecutor is
allowed to exercise selectivity in her selection of prosecution, but
the systematic discrimination in enforcement and the unjust or
illegal discrimination between persons who are similarly situated
violates the protection of the equal protection clause and renders
the prosecution invalid."' As noted by Justice Mathews in the
United States Supreme Court decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins:"
...[If a law] is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is within the prohibition of the

Constitution.'

13

In order to prevail with a claim that a particular prosecution
violates a defendant's equal protection rights, the defendant has
the burden of showing that the government has acted with an
intent or purpose to discriminate." 4 The defendant must show
that he or she is a member of a class of individuals which is subject
to the selective enforcement of penal provisions. 15 "Some credible evidence must be adduced indicating that the government
intentionally and purposefully discriminated against the defend' 6
ant by failing to prosecute other similarly situated persons."
The defendant's burden to establish a showing of selective prosecution involves two elements: 1) that the defendant was singled
out for prosecution among other defendants which were similarly
situated; and 2) the motivation for the prosecution was improperly
constitutionally protected rights, the judiciary must protect against unconstitutional
deprivations.").
109. Id. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to federal prosecutors), rev'd, Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
110. See generally Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). An excellent discussion of
the different treatment of Indians and non-Indians can be found in David C. Williams, The
Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 759 (1991).
111. Id. See also United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 568 (3rd Cir. 1979).
112. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
113. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
114. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
115. Torquato, 602 F.2d at 569-70.
116. Id. at 570.
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founded upon race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.1 17
The burden of showing selective prosecution is a "rigorous"
burden to overcome. 118 A defendant must show at least a colorable claim of an improper motive for prosecution and must further
show that the prosecution has been selectively undertaken before
he or she can even initiate discovery, to substantiate the impermissible prosecution, or prior to the court providing an evidentiary
hearing on such issues. 19
A defendant may wish to base the equal protection challenge
on the United States Attorney's intentional and proposed rule disregard of the Petite policy. 120 The federal courts have been receptive to the defense of discriminatory prosecution and have
extended that defense to the application of prosecutorial policies
12
such as the Petite policy which appears neutral on its face. 1
VIII.

AVOIDING DUAL PROSECUTION BY ASSERTING
THE SHAM DEFENSE OR ATTACKING THE
SUPER PROSECUTOR

The United States Supreme Court implicitly carved out two
exceptions to the dual sovereignty principle in Bartkus.122 The
first exception "bars a second prosecution [when] one prosecuting
sovereign can be said to be acting as a 'tool' of the other" prosecuting sovereign. 2 3 A second and closely related exception provides
a bar to prosecutions which amount to only a "sham" or "cover"
for the first prosecution. 1 24 These exceptions have rarely if ever
been successfully asserted by defendants in preventing dual
25
prosecutions. 1
One defendant has been successful in challenging his prosecution in federal court following a dismissal in a Virginia state court
on the basis that the prosecution was only a sham.' 2 6 In United
117. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983); accord Attorney
General of United States v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983), reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1056 (1983).
118. Torquato, 602 F.2d at 569 (citing United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973)) (3rd Cir. 1973).
119. Id. at 569-70 (citations omitted).
120. Allerhand, supra note 24, at 1147.
121. Id.
122. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
123. United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1984) (citing Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 (1959)).
124. Id. (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 910 (2nd Cir. 1984)
(stating that although the exceptions outlined in Bartkus are ambiguous, the court did not
need to define the exceptions because the defendant's allegations fell "far short").
126. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (D.Ct. Va. 1991).
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States v. Belcher,'2 7 the Honorable Glen M. Williams, Judge of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
dismissed a federal indictment as "simply 'a sham and a cover' for
the [prosecutors'] first, unsuccessful [attempt]" at prosecuting the
1 28
defendant in state court for the same charges.
While it may appear that Judge Williams had taken a bold step
in protecting defendants from unjust persecution, a closer examination of the case reveals a rather unique set of facts.12 9 The most
unique and pivotal fact was that the prosecuting attorney prose130
cuted for both the State of Virginia and the United States.
Judge Williams found that the overlap of the prosecutor's functions as both a state and federal prosecutor destroyed the separation of the sovereignties and eliminated the dual sovereignty
principle. 1 3 ' In his opinion, Judge Williams stated the following:
In fact, it seems to the court that if the same prosecutor
simultaneously derives power from both a state and the
federal government, then the whole underpinning of federalism is destroyed. The fact that two sovereigns have
essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor strongly
suggests to the court that in reality there are no longer
two [separate] sovereigns at work. Instead, the pooling of
prosecutorial power effectively creates one "super sovereign," i.e., a unitary government. Thus, a central government is actually at work here, not a federal
government. . . [I]t was precisely such aggregations of
power that the founding fathers sought to avoid when
they established a federal system of government via the
32
Constitution.1
The application of the decision in Belcher in this federal district is probably limited. The authors are not aware of any
instances when the United States Attorney's Office has acted in the
additional capacity of state or tribal prosecutor; it is more likely in
North Dakota that the same individuals would share tribal and
state prosecutorial duties. However, the principles first outlined in
Bartkus and later relied on in Belcher may be able to be expanded.
For instance, there have been increasing efforts to coordinate state
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

762 F. Supp. 666 (D.Ct. Va. 1991).
United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 671 (D.Ct. Va. 1991).
Id. at 668.

Id.
Id. at 670-71.
Id. at 671.
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and federal prosecutions, and it may be argued that at some point
the cooperation begins to blur the dual sovereignty long enough to
1 33
cause an elimination of the separate sovereigns, as in Belcher.
A number of courts have implied that collusion between fed1 34
eral and state authorities could prevent a second prosecution.
While cooperation between federal and state authorities will not
bar prosecution, collusion between federal and state authorities
may give rise to the "sham" exception of Bartkus.135 In the age of
limited law enforcement resources and advances in communications, it is possible that this exception to the dual sovereignty rule
may grow from an inference in Bartkus to a widely accepted
principle.
IX.

A RECENT OPINION FROM THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

The Eighth Circuit on an appeal from the Federal District
Court for the District of North Dakota recently addressed the
issues surrounding the application of the Petite policy to limit prosecutions in United States v. Lester.13 6 Lester had been accused of
committing a rape which occurred on the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation. 1 37 While the federal authorities investigated the
claim, Lester was convicted of rape and simple assault by the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court.' 3 s Lester was sentenced to a
term of incarceration for a period of six months for the rape conviction and thirty days for the simple assault conviction.' 3 9
Following the tribal court convictions, the federal authorities
completed their investigation and charged Lester with aggravated
sexual abuse in violation of sections 2241(a) and 1153 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.' 40 Lester sought to "dismiss the indictment on Double Jeopardy grounds for violation of the Department
of Justice's internal Petite policy.' 14 1 The motion to dismiss was
133. See generally Dawson, supra note 10, at 296-99 (stating that the close working
relationship between state and federal agencies has blurred the separation of sovereignties).
134. See generally United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Aboumoussallem,
726 F.2d 906, 910 (2nd Cir. 1984).
135. See Bernhardt,831 F.2d at 182.
136. 992 F.2d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1993).
137. Lester, 992 F.2d at 175.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Eighth Circuit also noted that the tribal court was limited to imposing
imprisonment for one year or less, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7). Id. at n.1.
140. Id. Interestingly, the federal investigation was completed approximately six
months after the tribal court sentencing. Id.
141. Id.
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granted and the government appealed.1 4 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the
District Court.' 4 3 The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's
assertion that the Petite policy granted the defendant substantive
rights.' 4 4 Relying on several prior Eighth Circuit cases, the Eighth
14 5
Circuit quickly dispatched Lester's assertion.
While Lester once again affirmed the view that the Petite policy does not create any substantive rights, it serves as an important
reminder that courts may be willing to seek ways in which to bar
the second prosecution of a defendant for the same acts for which
he or she had previously been prosecuted. 146 The real question
here is not whether the Petite policy bestows any magical rights,
but whether the prosecution has elected to ignore the fundamentals of fairness. Any prosecutor should be able to prosecute, but
can they refrain from prosecution when justice so requires?
Unless a new approach to a perceived abuse of prosecutorial discretion is undertaken by defense attorneys, such as asserting an
equal protection violation, and proves to be successful, it is clear
that the Petite policy itself will not be a useful tool. Until such time
that an alternative approach proves successful, defendants are left
to the discretion of the prosecution. That discretion can either be
abused or constructively used.
X.

CONCLUSION

The State of North Dakota has within its borders federal, state,
and tribal sovereigns. All three entities have an interest in insuring that their citizens are afforded the same protections as citizens
of the other entities in individual dealings with the foreign judicial
systems. In no area is this more important than in the area of
criminal justice. All citizens should be afforded protection from
needless prosecutions on the basis of race. While it is likely that
more data will have to be compiled in order to demonstrate that
there has been an improper prosecution of tribal members in fed142. Lester, 992 F.2d at 175.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 176. The defendant argued that Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27
(1977), and Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248 (1980) established that the principle
reason to enforce the Petite policy was fairness and that these decisions mandated that the
Petite policy be applied. Id. Both Rinaldi and Thompson can be easily distinguished in that
the dismissals in those cases were a result of the government's own motions. Id. at 176-77.
145. Id. at 176.
146. Again, the authors wish to reiterate that they do not necessarily disagree with dual
prosecutions or with the outcome of Lester. From the facts of that case, it would appear
that the United States had a substantial, unvindicated federal interest. See Lester, 992 F.2d
at 176. Thus, a dual prosecution was warranted.
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eral court following convictions in a tribal court, early warning
signs have already appeared. It is alarming that in a state where
the general practitioner is routinely in state and federal court that
only one out of forty individuals who have experienced dual tribal
and state prosecution have also experienced dual state and federal
prosecution. While it is important that we leave with our prosecutors discretion as to which crimes will be prosecuted and which
individuals will be indicted, we cannot stand by and watch as our
laws are applied with "an evil eye and an unequal hand."

